The goal of this paper is to introduce ideas and methodology of the generic case complexity to cryptography community. This relatively new approach allows one to analyze the behavior of an algorithm on "most" inputs in a simple and intuitive fashion which has some practical advantages over classical methods based on averaging.
Introduction
Generic case complexity has originated about a decade ago in combinatorial group theory [10, 2] . This area has long computational traditions with many fundamental problems being algorithmic in nature. It has been shown that most computational problems in infinite group theory are recursively undecidable. However, it was also observed that decision algorithms, sometimes very naive ones, exist for many inputs even if a problem is undecidable in general.
Generic complexity was suggested as a way of analyzing the behavior of undecidable problems. The main question was to describe the complexity of a problem on a generic input or on a set which contains most of the inputs. The idea was to separate sets of inputs where algorithms work from the "bad ones. It happened that quite often the number of inputs on which algorithms fail to provide an answer are small.
In computer science, around 1980s, the same kind of arguments preceded the development of the average case complexity. More recently, heuristic classes of algorithms were introduced [1] .
Advocates of generic complexity approach argue (see discussions in [4] ) that it is simpler, intuitive and more general then the average case complexity. The connection between the two areas has been studied and it is known that there are ISSN 1867-1144 / $ 2.50 c Heldermann Verlag problems which are hard on average, but generically easy. It turns out however, that if an algorithm is easy on average it is also easy generically.
The relation between generic complexity and heuristic complexity is less explored. It was shown [4] that the class of generic algorithms and errorless heuristic algorithms are equivalent. It seems that generic complexity has some advantage as the area has significantly progressed in recent years. For example the completeness theory for generic complexity has been developed.
Here we list some results in generic complexity. As we mentioned above, the foundations were built in group theory. In particular it has been shown that the famous word and conjugacy problems in finitely presented groups can be decided in linear time on a generic set of inputs, although these problems are undecidable in general [10] .
In the scope of the classical complexity results, the most important is the existence of polynomial reductions for generic complexity. Using these reductions it has been shown that there exist generically NP-complete problems, for example bounded versions of the halting and Post correspondence problems are generically NP-complete [4] . Another interesting result shows that the halting problem for a model of a Turing machine with one-way infinite tape is linearly decidable on a generic set of inputs [8] . It is not known whether the result holds for an arbitrary Turing machine, but it was shown that the set on which the problems is decidable cannot be strongly generic [13] .
In [11] authors describe a particular procedure which allows one given an undecidable problem to construct a problem undecidable on every generic set of inputs. This generic amplification shows that generically hard (undecidable) problems exist.
It was also suggested that generic complexity might be useful for cryptographic applications, particularly for testing security assumptions of cryptographic primitives. Intuitively, we would like a cryptographic primitive to be hard to break on most inputs which seems like a straightforward application of the ideas of generic complexity. The main goal of this paper is to introduce ideas and methodology of generic complexity to cryptography community. We present alternative definitions of one-way functions based on the concept of generic complexity.
These new definitions allow one to consider, in a natural way, one-way function candidates coming from undecidable problems. We show that any such "generic one-way function can be used to produce a classical one. Therefore, any new generic one-way function comes along with new classical one. Furthermore, to our opinion these new definitions are more intuitive and are easier to work with. Indeed, the new security assumption is just a more precise formalization of the original notion, due to Diffie and Hellman [3] , in a sense, it separates the probability on the inputs from the probability on the oracle choices which makes considerations easier. As an illustration, we give a short proof that extending adversaries to a larger class of partial algorithms with errors does not change the strength of the security assumption.
In the subsequent paper we are going to discuss some potential generic one-way functions that are related to undecidable problems in algebra.
Generic complexity notations
In this section we give a brief overview of the basic notions and definitions used in generic complexity. For more detailed introduction to the subject and latest results we refer to [4] .
Let I be a set of inputs. In this paper we consider traditional binary representation of inputs and set I = {0, 1} * . With each input we associate a size function | · | : I → N which is the length of a string from I.
First we define a stratification of inputs. In general a stratification of the set I is an ascending sequence of subsets whose union is equal to I. In the paper we will use the spherical stratification on strings which we define next. Then the sequence I 0 , I 1 , I 2 , . . . is a spherical stratification of I.
Note that sets I i are finite and ∪ ∞ i=0 I i = I. There are other commonly used stratifications available. For example one can stratify set I using balls B n of inputs of radius n, where B n is a set of inputs with lengths at most n. In the paper we will be mostly concerned with the ensemble of uniform spherical distributions {u n } over I. For a set R ⊆ I we define
where |X| is the cardinality of a set X.
Next we define an asymptotic density of a set in I. A set R is called generic with respect to µ if its asymptotic density is 1 and it is called negligible if the asymptotic density is 0. is called the density function for R.
A practical measure of the "largeness of a set often corresponds to a rate with which the limit in Definition 1.3 converges. The convergence can be naturally described by obtaining upper bounds on the density function of a set. One particular type of sets of interest are sets which have superpolynomial convergence rates.
Definition 1.5. Let R ⊆ I and δ R (n) is the density function of R. We say that R has asymptotic density ρ(R) with superpolynomial convergence if
for every polynomial p(n) and all sufficiently large n. Definition 1.6 (Strongly Generic/Negligible). A generic set with superpolynomial convergence is called strongly generic and its complement is called a strongly negligible set.
One-Way functions
Existence of one-way functions is one of the most basic and important assumptions in cryptography. In fact existence of one-way functions is a minimal assumption required for constructing other cryptographic primitives such as pseudorandom number generators, encryption and signature schemes.
Diffie and Hellman [3] define one-way functions:
"a function f is a one-way function if, for any argument x in the domain of f , it is easy to compute the corresponding value f (x), yet, for almost all y in the range of f , it is computationally infeasible to solve the equation y = f (x) for any suitable argument x.
There are two key points in the definition above: "for almost all and "computationally infeasible . A lot of attention is still concentrated on the development and understanding of these two notions and their consequences from the practical point of view.
It is well accepted now that one-way functions cannot be defined using deterministic worst-case complexity classes like P and NP, and randomized computation is the default model for cryptographic purposes.
A common argument for the necessary conditions for one-way functions to exist proceeds as follows [5] . Suppose we have a cryptographic scheme. Legitimate parties should be able to decode the secret efficiently, which means that there exist a polynomial-time verifiable witness to the decoding and the problem of breaking a cryptographic scheme is in NP. For a cryptographic scheme to be considered secure there should be no practical algorithm to break the encryption. Therefore, if a secure cryptographic scheme exists then NP ⊆ BPP. Whether BPP contains NP is an open problem. Note that NP ⊆ BPP implies that P = NP.
The NP ⊆ BPP condition is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a secure cryptographic scheme to exist. Observe that the probability distribution in the definition of the class BPP is taken over the internal states of a probabilistic machine only. The condition which bounds away the probability of an error must hold for all inputs. In this sense BPP is analogues to P and is still reflects the behavior of a problem on the worst case inputs but with respect to the randomized algorithms.
The positive answer to the problem NP ∈ BPP may have no practical implications for cryptography, unless there are problems which belong in NP\BPP and are hard on a significantly large fraction of inputs. Speaking in terms of generic complexity, a problem may be considered hard if there is no efficient algorithm which solves the problem on any but strongly negligible set of inputs.
In cryptography the existence of many useful primitives like secure symmetric encryption, pseudorandom number generators and digital signature schemes is reduced to the existence of the one-way functions which we define next. In general there are two notions of one-way functions a strong and a weaker one.
Let Pr (x,σ) denote the probability taken uniformly over all pairs (x, σ) ∈ I n × Σ, where I n is the set of all inputs of length n and Σ = {0, 1} t(n) is the space of internal coin flips of a probabilistic algorithm whose running time is bounded by some polynomial t(n). Similarly we define Pr σ as the uniform probability taken over Σ only.
One of the most commonly accepted definitions of a one-way function (strong one-way function) is the following. Definition 1.7 (Strong One-Way function [5] ). A function f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * is called strongly one-way if the following two conditions hold:
1.
Easy to compute: there exists a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm A ′ such that on an input x algorithm A ′ outputs f (x); 2.
Hard to invert: For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, every positive polynomial p, and all sufficiently large n:
where U n is a random variable uniformly distributed over {0, 1} n and the probability is taken over all input strings from {0, 1} n and internal states of A.
Here and in the rest of the article polynomial-time algorithm means an algorithm that always halts after a polynomial (in the length of the input) number of steps.
Note that in addition to an input in the range of f the algorithm A is given the auxiliary input 1 n which has the same length as the desired output of A. This is done to protect from the situations when the function f drastically reduces the length of its input (for example |f (x)| = log 2 (|x|)). Obviously no algorithm can invert such function f in polynomial number of steps in terms of |x|.
Generic definitions of one-way functions

Definition restricted to PPT adversary
In Definition 1.7 the performance of an algorithm A is averaged over all inputs which results in complicated probability space. We would like to apply ideas of generic complexity and consider the performance of an adversary on each input separately.
Note that a naive random sampling will guess an inverse of a function f on the input of length n with probability 1/2 n . An algorithm with negligible probability of the correct answer cannot be amplified and, therefore, cannot be considered practical. A reasonable inversion algorithm should have noticeable probability of success.
To be more precise the probability that an algorithm A inverts f (x)
for any positive constant c. To make a one-way function secure we must limit the number of inputs on which adversary succeeds to a small set. We formalize these arguments in the following definition of a generically strong one-way function. Hard to invert almost all inputs: For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, all constants c > 0, every positive polynomial p and all sufficiently large n:
where the probability is taken over internal states of the algorithm A.
Similarly we can define a generically weak one-way function. A function f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * is called generically weak one-way if the following two conditions hold:
1. Easy to compute: there exists a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm A ′ such that on input x algorithm A ′ outputs f (x); 2.
Hard to invert on a large enough set of inputs: For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, every constant c > 0 there exists a polynomial p(n) such that for all sufficiently large n:
The following lemmas show that Definitions 2.1 and 1.7 are equivalent. We give equivalence results for strong one-way functions. Similar results hold for the weak notion as well (see Appendix for the detailed proof). We use standard reduction argument which proceeds by showing that if there exists an algorithm which violates the conditions of the first definition then we can construct an algorithm which will violate conditions of the second one. Then there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A ′ such that for infinitely many n
Proof. First of all observe that since we can compute f , we can also check whether an algorithm indeed returns an inverse of f (x) or not. By definition,
Now construct an algorithm A ′ as follows. Repeat algorithm A on a given input x until a witness for the inverse problem (i.e. the inverse itself) is obtained. Let
For the algorithm A ′ to be practical on the set S n we need to show that for every x ∈ S n we can obtain an inverse with high probability using only polynomially many repetitions of A, i.e.
where k = p(n) and ǫ < 1 n m for any m > 0. Let y i be the output of the ith run of the algorithm A on an input x ∈ S n and let X i , i = 1, . . . , k be random variables such that X i = 1 if y i ∈ f −1 (f (x)) and X i = 0 otherwise. X i are mutually independent and E[X i ] = Pr[X i = 1] ≥ 1 n c . We also define X o i , i = 1, . . . , k to be random variables such that
to produce an answer only one of y i s needs to be a witness, therefore to show (1) we need to show that
Using Chernoff bound we have
Substituting δ = (k − n c )/(k(n c − 1)) into (3) we obtain
Let k = n 3c , then
and we have
Therefore we obtained
where ǫ = 2 − 1 2 (n+2) . Note that a similar result can be obtained without using the Chernoff bound, however, it allows us to obtain a tighter bound on the number of repetitions of the algorithm A.
Taking the sum over all x ∈ S n we obtain
Note that
u n (S n ) = |S n | |I n | ≥ 1 n d . Therefore |S n | ≥ |I n | n d = 2 n n d .
It follows
x∈Sn
Next we show that Pr (x,σ) 
Now we have
Pr (x,σ) 
where p(x, σ) is the joint probability mass function.
Note that x and σ are independent from each other, therefore
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It is easy to see that 1/n d (1 − ǫ) > 1/n d ′ for n ≥ 2. Therefore we have
The implication holds in the the opposite direction as well.
Lemma 2.4. Let f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * and suppose there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A such that for some polynomial p(n) and infinitely many n
.
Then there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A ′ such that for every c > 0 and infinitely many n
Proof. First we show that
The proof follows directly from the following averaging argument:
Observe that
If we set a i = Pr σ [A(f (x i )) ∈ f −1 (f (x i ))], x i ∈ I n , N = 2 n , ρ = 1/p(n) and k = #{x ∈ I n | Pr σ [A(f (x)) ∈ f −1 (f (x))] > 1/2p(n)} then it follows from the claim above that k 2 n ≥ 1 2p(n) and
Now observe that for any c > 0 there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A ′ such that
Indeed, in the case when n −c ≥ 1/2p(n) the claim follows directly. In the second case when n −c < 1/2p(n) we can use the probabilistic error reduction and construct an algorithm A ′ such that (6) holds. Therefore there exists a polynomialtime algorithm A ′ such that
The following result demonstrates the connection between the security assumption and asymptotic properties of the input sets. Proof. Suppose f is strongly one-way and suppose there exists an algorithm A which inverts f on a set S which is not strongly negligible. Then there exists a polynomial p(n) such that
Therefore f is not strongly one-way by Definition 2.1.
Now, suppose f is not one-way. Then there exists an algorithm A such that
for some polynomial p, which contradicts the proposition assumption. 
Generic definition with a more general adversary
The most interesting question is whether the generic approach may give us new, more general security assumptions. Note that the polynomial bound on the adversary is not necessary. The only condition that a successful adversary needs to satisfy is to have an algorithm which terminates in polynomial time and with correct answer on a non-negligible set of inputs. Suppose we would like to make a security statement which holds against a much stronger adversary, i.e. a partial probabilistic heuristic algorithm which may output incorrect answers. Although an adversary algorithm may not terminate on some inputs, it would still be a threat if it succeeds on a relatively large set of inputs.
Definition 2.7 (Partial algorithm with errors). Let I be the set of inputs. We say that an algorithm A is a partial algorithm with errors if it is correct on a subset X ⊆ I of inputs and on the set I − X it either does not stop or stops with an incorrect answer.
To make a formal statement we need a notion of achievement ratio of an adversary which is similar to the notions given in [6, 9] . 
where T A,f (x) is the time required for A to terminate on the input f (x) and
Achievement ratio allows one to consider a larger class of algorithms whose running time may not be bounded by a polynomial. In order for an adversary to have a polynomial achievement ratio on a given input x, it has to have both: the polynomial running time and a noticeable probability of inverting f (x).
The following definition is an attempt to give an intuitive notion of a generalized practical security assumption for a one-way function. Easy to compute: there exists a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm A ′ such that on input x algorithm A ′ outputs f (x); 2.
Hard to invert: For every partial probabilistic algorithm with errors A, all constants c > 0, every positive polynomial p and all sufficiently large n:
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The question is whether or not this definition gives us any advantage over the definitions given earlier. The following argument says that if we allow only a polynomial number of steps for an adversary on a success then, in fact, this definition is equivalent to the one which is limited to the PPT adversary.
The main idea is that since the success of an adversary on an input x means that it has to terminate in polynomial number of steps, then we do not really care if adversary is a partial algorithm or not. If we have a successful partial algorithm then we can construct a PPT algorithm by allowing it to run for polynomial number of steps and this polynomial-time algorithm will be as successful as the partial one.
Let GSPPT and GSPART be the classes of one way functions which satisfy conditions of Definition 2.1 and Definition 2.9 respectively. Proof. First we show that f ∈ GSPART implies f ∈ GSPPT. The proof is by contradiction. Let f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * and assume that f ∈ GSP ART , but f ∈ GSP P T , then there exists a PPT algorithm A, a constant c > 0, a polynomial p(n) such that for infinitely many n
Note that a PPT algorithm A is also a partial probabilistic algorithm such that T A,f (x) ≤ q(n), for some positive polynomial q for all x. Therefore,
where d is chosen such that n d ≥ q(n)·n c . This is a contradiction to the condition f ∈ GSP ART .
The proof in the opposite direction uses a similar argument. Suppose that f ∈ GSPPT but f ∈ GSPART. In other words we suppose there exists a partial probabilistic algorithm B such that for some polynomial p(n) and infinitely many n
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2.10. Suppose that f ∈ GW P ART but f ∈ GW P P T . Then there exists a PPT algorithm B and constant c > 0 such that for all polynomials p(n)
The probabilistic polynomial time algorithm B is a probabilistic partial algorithm such that its time T B,f (x) ≤ q(n) for some positive polynomial q and all x.
Therefore, there exists a probabilistic partial algorithm B such that for all positive polynomials p:
Which contradicts the assumption that f ∈ GW P ART .
Now note that if f is not weakly one-way in terms of Definition 2.11 then there exists a partial algorithm B such that for some constant c > 0 and every polynomial poly(n)
. Therefore, u n {x ∈ I n | δ A,f (x) < n −c } < 1 poly(n) for any polynomial poly(n). Therefore, f is not weakly one way with respect to a PPT algorithm A.
One of the important results about one-way functions is the so-called amplification theorem which states that having a weak one-way function we can always construct a strong one. Equivalences shown above allow us to make a similar statement for generic one-way function. Proof. The proof is a corollary of the equivalence Lemmas 2.3, 2.4, 2.10, 2.12 and the classical amplification theorem. Lemma A.3 (Generic implies Classic). Suppose there exists a PPT algorithm A such that for some (equivalently all) c > 0, all polynomials p and infinitely many n u n {x ∈ I n | δ A,f (x) < n −c } < 1 p(n) then there exists a PPT algorithm A ′ such that for all polynomials q(n) and infinitely many n Pr (x,σ) [A(f (U n ), 1 n ) ∈ f −1 (f (U n ))] < 1 q(n) .
Proof. Observe that
Then u n (S n ) = |S n | 2 n ≥ 1 − From the proof of the equivalence for the case of strong one way functions we know that
Pr (x,σ) [A(f (U n ), 1 n ) ∈ f −1 (f (U n ))] ≥ 1 2 n x∈Sn δ A,f (x).
Therefore
Pr (x,σ) [A(f (U n ), 1 n ) ∈ f −1 (f (U n ))] ≥ 1 n c p(n) Again, from the proof of the strong version we know that by repeating the algorithm A polynomially many times we can obtain an algorithm A ′ such that
Pr (x,σ) [A ′ (f (U n ), 1 n ) ∈ f −1 (f (U n ))] ≥ 1 − ǫ where ǫ < 1/q(n) for any positive polynomial q(n). Then
for all polynomials q(n).
